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Abstract
This paper applies a reading of the postmodernisation of law to the incremental reform of
agricultural holdings legislation over the last century.  In charting the shifting legal basis of
agricultural tenancies, from ‘black letter’ positivism to the cultural contextuality of
sumptuary law, the paper theorises that the underlying political imperative has been allied
to the changing significance of property ownership and use.  Rather than reflecting the
long-term official desire to maintain the let sector in British agriculture, however, the
paper argues that this process has had other aims.  In particular, it has been about an
annexation of law to legitimise the retention of landowner power while presenting a
rhetorical ‘democratisation’ of farming, away from its plutocratic associations and towards
a new narrative of ‘depersonalised’ business.
Introduction
In his work on law and popular culture, Redhead (1995) suggests that the processes
underlying the shift from modernity to late, or post, modernity - and the emergence of the
‘post-literate’ society - may herald the end to formalist legal positivism, with alternative
methods and techniques being derived predominantly from text; the construct of law as
literary (or policy?) pursuit.  Within this new project, the post-modernisation of legal
relations, the individual ceases to be defined in relation to other individuals, but becomes
instead defined in relation to artefacts.  Following Redhead, we argue that property is a
significant element of this process, with the property right and its ownership (the right to
2property), increasingly assuming the status of reified artefact against which all ind viduals
are othered.
Central to this conceptualisation of legal relations is what Redhead (1995) suggests is a
search for the mapping of a new ‘post-modern jurisprudence’ in which both space and
place assume particular significance.  With apparent reference to the simulacrum, de Sousa
Santos (1987) suggests that the relationship which formalist law increasingly entertains
with social ‘reality’ is similar to that between maps and spatial reality.  This is supported
by evidence from a number of western nations that rights to property are reified as both
the primary subject of social policy and the basis of rhetorical market-based resource
allocation.
In this reading, space is conceptualised as being capable of being ‘emptied’ - of deriving its
value separately from its use.  It is this ‘emptying’ of space which establishes the ‘created
environment’ (Giddens, 1984) in which new forms of institutional articulation can be
expressed.  At the core of these new forms of articulation is, we argue, a post modern
reincarnation of the long-standing relationship between the ‘owners’ and the ‘users’ - the
landlords and tenants - of land.  Although largely subject to the ‘black letter’ positivism of
land law, this relationship arguably has stronger roots in ‘sumptuary law’, the regulation of
conspicuous consumption.  Contrary to established wisdom, that this form of regulation
has been in decline since early modernity, Hunt (1996) argues that it persists, but in a
highly diffuse form, dispersed throughout a range of public and private forms of
governance.
3An example of this process of changing (and diffusing) regulation, reflecting a decline in
formalist law at the expense of cultural sumptuary law, is the relationship between the
landlords and tenants of agricultural land in England and Wales.  In this paper we suggest
that the ‘evolution’ of this relationship reflects the wider cultural influences on law and
society, being based on the dualism of continued rhetorical recognition of the relative
power implicit in the landlord/tenant relationship in agriculture, contextualised against the
changing socio-cultural construct of law. As a consequence, we argue, individual reforms
of the law, such as those occurring in the Agricultural Holdings Acts of 1948 and 1984, or
the Agricultural Tenancies Act 1995, need to be viewed within the cultural legal context
of the empirical development of both land and agricultural policy.
During the first century of its evolution, when the vast majority of farmers were tenants,
the agricultural landlord/tenant relationship reflected a largely benign ‘partnership’ based
on the largely unencumbered social, political and financial power of landowners to dictate
the terms and conditions of tenant farming.  Supported by a positivist legal system in
which the market-based allocation of rights, particularly in property, was both presumed
and protected (Bergeron, 1993), this partnership generally resulted in a long-term view
being taken of both the occupation and the use of the land.  This position began to decline
towards the end of the Nineteenth Century, in the face of mounting cultural opposition to
the power of land ownership and increasing public regulation of sumptuary law.  As a
result, Parliament and the Courts began increasingly to intervene in the relationship, to
4‘redress’ the perceived imbalance.  This was achieved by improving both the statutory and
financial position of tenants, with respect to their landlords.
There can be little doubt that the position of existing tenant farmers was significantly
improved as a result of these reforms, particularly with regard to security of tenure and
end-of-tenancy compensation.  This was further reinforced by the Agriculture
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, which guaranteed existing tenants’ families two
generations security of tenure, subject to relatively minor qualifications.  However, the
simultaneous decline in both the opportunities for new tenants and the total area of
farmland subject to agricultural tenancies (see Table 1) indicates that the reforms did more
to contribute to the overall decline of the landlord/tenant relationship than they did to
reinforce it.  This came about predominantly as a result of the continued, property-based,
‘re-empowerment’ of landowners (Marsden, 1986).
Since the 1976 Act, agricultural property law reform has been more openly based on
measures designed to make agriculture apparently more ‘accessible’, particularly to new
entrants.  Paradoxically, while the imperative for this has not been driven by concern for
landowner rights, but by the need to demonstrate declining plutocracy in the distribution
of subsidies from the Common Agricultural Policy, the impact has been to enhance those
rights.  This occurred first through marginal shifts incorporated in the Agricultural
Holdings Act 1984 and then, more recently, through the wholesale reforms introduced in
the Agricultural Tenancies Act 1995, with its sweeping return to the ‘freedom of contract’
first enjoyed by Victorian landowners.
5Table 1 Agricultural Land Tenure in Great Britain, 1908-1994
Year % area
rented/mainly
rented
% holdings
rented/mainly
rented
1908 88 88
1922 82 86
1950 62 60
1960 51 46
1970 45 42
1980 42 35
1984 40 31
1992 37 26
1994 35 24
Source: MAFF (1968 and 1995)
While recognising that the 1995 legislation has created much interest, as well as claims of
new activity, in the agricultural letting market (Kerr, 1994), this paper suggests that the
reforms and their rhetorically-claimed ‘success’ are based on a wilful mis-reading of the
empirical context of the agricultural landlord/tenant relationship.  Drawing upon
Redhead’s (1995) thesis, we suggest that rather than the decline in the tenanted sector
being landlord-driven, in response to the perceived reduction in the legally legitimated
6power of property, it has been predominantly tenant-driven, fuelled by agricultural policies
favouring farmers, particularly owner-occupiers, over landowners.
Using this reading of the process, we suggest that the recent reforms, allied to a number of
other factors, indicate an altogether different agenda.  This is not so much associated with
the maintenance or expansion of the tenanted sector per se, as it is with annexing the shift
within law, from positivist to populist, to transform the very nature of the relationship
between agricultural landlords and tenants.  In place of the former ‘partnership’, we argue
that there is a new form of commodification taking place in which short-term financial
decisions increasingly predominate.  In this new model of agricultural management,
notions of tenant farmers as ‘stewards’ or ‘custodians’ of the countryside are being
replaced by notions of them as business people, indicating in the process that the old ideas
of the ‘partnership’, or even the ‘relationship’, between individual landowners and
individual tenant farmers are becoming increasingly irrelevant.
The emergence of protection: 1875 to 1976
Following the unencumbered freedom enjoyed by landlords in the Nineteenth Century, the
early statutory enshrinement of tenants’ rights at the end of that period (in the Agricultural
Holdings [England] Acts of 1875, 1883 and 1906) can be viewed as part of wider social
reforms.  While the purported aim of the legislation was very much the protection of the
individual tenant-farmer exposed to the worst excesses of a totally unfettered system, it
actually did little more than concretise the existing, widely observed, customary practises
7adopted for such matters as rent settlements and compensation.  As such, the reforms did
less to challenge than to underpin the existing hegemonic order, with all agricultural
tenants continuing to be subject to tenancies from year to year with no security beyond the
current term.
Although this system prevailed largely unreformed until the end of the Second War, it had
become clear that the structure of British agriculture, if not its tenure, required overhaul.
Given that, by this time, the percentage of agricultural land that was tenanted had already
fallen from nearly 90% in 1900 to approximately 62% in 1948 (see Table 1), this position
was, at the least, asymmetric.  Two major pieces of legislation were passed, the
Agriculture Act 1947 and the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948. Taken together, these
measures were based on promoting the long-term stability of the agricultural economy,
particularly by encouraging production, ensuring profitability and revitalising investment.
This was achieved primarily through the implementation of price support measures and
improvement grants, with the role of the tenanted sector largely expected to remain as it
was.   Notwithstanding the decline in the let sector, therefore, the landlord/tenant
relationship remained, with tenants awarded security of tenure for life as an incentive to
invest in their farms and businesses.
The 1948 Act was retrospective, giving all existing and future tenants lifetime security.
This was heralded very much as protection not for the individual tenant but rather, in line
with wider post-war social reform, for the benefit of society as a whole.  A strict security
of tenure regime was also introduced, regulating the service of notices to quit and
8effectively limiting the occasions for evicting a well-behaved tenant to one: death.  In
addition, the 1948 Act also considered that a wide range of ‘lesser’ agreements should be
converted into agricultural tenancies.  This far-reaching statutory conversion was
underpinned by the attitude of the courts, which repeatedly confirmed that landowners’
attempts to contract out of the security provisions were of no effect.
While the 1948 Act undoubtedly made the position of existing tenants much more secure,
it did little to encourage fresh lettings.  Concurrently the underpinning, by the 1947 Act, of
farming profitability and confidence certainly made in-hand farming more attractive.  The
confidence afforded to owner-occupiers by protected prices meant that landowners letting
their farms under what was now a system of protected rents struggled to match the returns
achievable from farming it themselves.   While some of the post-war decline in the amount
of let land can therefore be explained by landlords taking land back in hand rather than
reletting it, there was also a parallel trend for tenant farmers to buy their landlords’ interest
and become owner-occupiers themselves (Orwin, 1949).
The wholesale movement towards owner-occupation may thus have been one which was
predominantly tenant-, rather than landlord-, led.  This suggests that the political
concentration on measures to protect the tenant may, as a consequence, have been mis-
directed and could have actually contributed to the decline, indicating clearly that the
effect of law was increasingly at odds with the law itself.
Asset values
9One impact of the legislative reforms was the development of a two-tier market in
agricultural land, with a widening disparity in capital values between let and vacant
possession land.  This divergence, the ‘vacant possession premium’, has at times been so
significant that vacant possession land has been selling for as much as twice the price of
tenanted land ( Nix, et al, 1987).  It has been suggested (Ravenscroft, 1988) that this
premium arises in part from the low rental income received by landlords when compared
to the capital value of vacant possession land.  The wish to maintain asset values, or
indeed to enhance them wherever possible, has thus further fuelled both the trend towards
owner-occupation and, arguably more significantly, the increasing reification of short-term
gains over longer-term stability within the industry.
Tenant farmers have inevitably benefited individually from this divergence in asset values,
in that they have been able to buy into owner-occupation at a price reflecting their own
secure position.  Tenants could thus take account of marriage value and effectively and
comfortably outbid the investor purchaser.  In 1993, for example, approximately 10% of
all agricultural land purchases were by sitting tenants (Ward, 1994).
We argue that the outcome of this process led to the development of an asymmetrical
position in which the tenant, as farmer, had become viewed as an important part of the
agricultural economy - and thus society as a whole - while the other, the agricultural
landlord, had increasingly been constructed as alien.  In the post-World War II period, the
landlord has been viewed much as any other investor, and had consequently not enjoyed
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the tax benefits bestowed upon farmers and owner-occupiers.  Indeed, tax issues have
been a positive disincentive to the letting of land, arguably contributing as much to the
decline in the let sector as the property reform legislation (Gibbard and Ravenscroft,
1993).
As a consequence of the combination of these legal, social and fiscal factors, allied to the
increasing distrust by investors of advancing government land regulation, the trend
towards asset mobilisation and owner-occupation has hardly been surprising.  In-hand
farming has arisen either by landlords retaining possession once tenancies have fallen in, or
by selling to sitting tenants, often as a means of realising capital to meet death duties (and
its successors) or to re-invest in higher yielding investments.
Continuing Reform
Notwithstanding the evidence that the socio-economic context within which agricultural
law reform was operating had, if anything, contributed to the decline of the let sector, the
interests of tenant farmers were further protected by reforms in the mid-1970s.  In tandem
with extending residential protection through the Rent Act 1977, the Labour Government
of the time introduced similar measures to protect farm tenant families through the
Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976.  It had been observed that as farm
tenancies effectively ceased on the death of the tenant, their families, whose association
with the farms often went back several generations, were being displaced. Taking the view
that this was inequitable, and that the most suitable person to continue to farm the land
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was probably a member of the next generation of the tenant’s family, the government
introduced the far-reaching concept of succession.
In providing security for two ‘successions’ from the original tenancy, the reforms
contained in the 1976 Act may well have succeeded in prolonging the life of existing
tenancies, evidenced in part by the slowing of the decline in the let sector since then.
However, there is little disagreement that the few remaining landowners willing to let
farmland pre-1976 would certainly not have entertained doing so after 1976.  As a
consequence, the number of new tenancies coming onto the market since then has been
minimal.
Reflecting this decline in the positivist relationship between landlords and tenants,
landowners increasingly sought alternative vehicles for the devolution of their proprietary
rights.  As a result, a multiplicity of arrangements, such as share-farming, partnerships and
contract farming arrangements, have arisen.  These carry the advantage to the landowner
of  retaining the vacant possession premium while minimising the risk of creating a secure
tenancy.  Most types of arrangement eventually secured the acceptance of the Inland
Revenue for treatment under Schedule D as income from farming (see Webb v Con lee
Properties 1992) and most carried with them the capital taxation benefits of owner-
occupied land.  Armed with these new weapons, landowners could still take advantage of
the skills and working capital of a farmer, without granting them a secure tenancy.
The post-modernisation of the agricultural tenancy
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While meeting many of the needs of landowners, the new ‘alternative’ arrangements failed
to gain wider acceptance, largely because they represented a rejection of public regulation,
as witnessed by the land occupancy debate following the Northfield Committee Report
(1979).  Rather than question the extent to which the agricultural tenancy retained its
relevance to a post-modernising, increasingly individualistic, society, the ‘failure’ of the
1976 Act reforms were soon constructed as a technical failing in which the protection of
the tenant had been taken ‘too far’.
Prolonged pressure by landowners and their representatives, most notably the Country
Landowners Association (1990), resulted in the Agricultural Holdings Act 1984.  This was
an attempt to breathe new life into the system by abolishing succession for entirely new
tenancies.  The land market was demonstrating both the demand from existing farmers for
more land and the will to part with possession by landowners. This Act was intended to
relieve the pressures on the market that had resulted from the imbalance between supply
and demand.  However, as subsequent surveys by the Central Association of Agricultural
Valuers (1996) have illustrated, it failed, and for a number of reasons:
· the continuing lack of confidence amongst landlords, particularly fearing the re-
imposition of succession rights in the future;
 
· remaining tax disincentives to letting, most notably the reluctance on the part of the
Inland Revenue to introduce a single rate of Agricultural Property relief;
 
· the early renewal of calls for further legislative reforms, from amongst others, the
Tenant Farmers’ Association (1990); and
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· a belief amongst landowners that the newly introduced formula for settling rent reviews
would not enable them to match open market rents for sitting tenants, meaning that the
vacant possession premiums were likely to remain.
During the early and mid-1980s, agriculture was facing a period of falling incomes and
growing pessimism over the future.  This led to demands, from within the industry, for
further legislative reform to ‘enable’ farmers to expand and to allow new ideas and ‘new
blood’ into agriculture.  As a result, in February 1991, MAFF issued a consultation paper
(MAFF, 1991).  Focusing very much on legislative reforms, the Ministry set four main
objectives:
·  to encourage more land to be let;
· to remove the legal complexities of the current legislation;
· to allow for diversification in the industry through flexible agreements; and
· to encourage new entrants into agriculture.
 
Once again the emphasis was on public regulation, but this time to deregulate and
‘simplify’ farm tenancies, in the belief that the existing legislation was ‘...inappropriate to a
market driven economy’ (MAFF, 1991).  In 1992, following the General Election, a
second consultation document was issued, retaining the doctrine of negotiated settlements
between landowners and tenants (MAFF, 1992).  This eventually paved the way for the
Agricultural Tenancies Act 1995.
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The Agricultural Tenancies Act 1995
With the creation of the new ‘Farm Business Tenancy’ (FBT), a mechanism has been
devised which, while retaining a degree of public regulation, purports to provide a
‘freedom of contract’ unknown in agriculture since 1875.  On the day that the Act
received Royal Assent, the Agriculture Minister stated:
... the Agricultural Tenancies Act will simplify the present legal framework and
encourage landowners to let more land.  Its provisions are designed to get new
blood into the agricultural industry to the advantage of us all (Waldegrave, 1995).
Reflecting a significant stage in the decline of positivist legal relations, and their
replacement with an increasingly privatised form of regulation, the parties to an FBT are,
theoretically at least, free to agree to any conditions they like.  Yet, in a number of
respects, notably, termination, rent review and compensation for improvements, the Act
has provided some protection for tenants.   The new law thus at once requires landowners
and tenants to discard any pre-conceived ideas about tenancies and statutory protection,
while concurrently recognising that their only referent is the institutional framework of
existing tenancies over land.
The 1995 Act was introduced amid an atmosphere of confidence and optimism,
particularly amongst the professional bodies who were to be largely responsible for
administering its implementation.  From the findings of its own survey (Kerr 1994), the
RICS suggested that the nature and structure of the reform package had been vindicated:
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The likelihood is that over half of new rentals will be on medium or longer
term lettings (ten years or more) which should allay fears within the
existing rented sector that tenancy reform will mean shorter and less secure
tenure (Lowry, 1994).
Heralding the potential success of the impending reforms, the RICS survey predicted the
availability for letting under the new Act of a further 900,000 acres, and that much of this
would be land previously farmed ‘in hand’ rather than the result of the formalisation of
other informal arrangements, as had been suggested elsewhere (Quinn, 1996).  However,
whilst this trend is identified in two surveys conducted subsequent to the passing of the
Act (Central Association of Agricultural Valuers, 1996 and Whitehead, 1996), the amount
of land being released from true owner-occupation appears small, and cannot lead to the
conclusion that there has been any increase in the size of the let sector. The later RICS
survey (Whitehead, 1996) also indicates that 89 per cent of FBTs have been let for 5 years
or less, and that 77 per cent of these are for areas of less than 100 acres.
As a result, the findings of both surveys suggest that the amount of land going into FBTs
will fall far short of the RICS’s earlier prediction and, indeed, may not even exceed the
amount of land continuing to come out of the let sector.  The extent to which this is
attributable primarily to the failure of the FBT is a matter for conjecture.  While
purporting to provide the benefits associated with the ‘extra-tenancy’ relationships it was
designed to replace, the legislation must still be seen in the light of the prevailing socio-
economic context, with its growing referent of short term financial flexibility and asset
mobility.
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Rather than being a genuinely ‘fresh’ approach to agricultural law reform, therefore, it is
clear that the 1995 system really represents no more than a continuation of past mistakes,
principally in failing to recognise the socio-economic context within which the reforms
have been situated.  Rather than the power-domination which has traditionally
characterised the landlord/tenant relationship, however, the current mistake involves the
failure to recognise that the 1995 Act effectively signals the removal of power from this
arena and, thus, the effective marginalisation of the relationship.
New entrants have historically faired badly under agricultural policy in the UK;
marginalisation of the landlord/tenant relationship can only intensify this.  Allied to the
marginalisation, agriculture itself is an increasingly capital-intensive industry, with financial
backers requiring evidence of collateral and proven ability to service borrowing.
Landowners have been seeking these attributes in their joint-venture partners and have
largely found them in the ranks of established farmers wishing to expand their existing
businesses.  The requirements for Farm Business Tenants are no different.  Indeed, the
first twelve months of the new regime witnessed rentals two to three times higher than
sitting tenant levels, putting FBTs beyond the reach of most established smaller farmers,
let alone entirely new entrants.  The short term nature of the new lets will not make
borrowing any easier, and the fact that 80% of the lettings are of unequipped, relatively
small, blocks of land (Whitehead, 1996) certainly favours neighbouring farms.
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In reflecting the evident reification of the right to property, the legislative measures being
used to introduce ‘freedom of contract’ are themselves far from simple.  Firstly, the
conditions that have to be satisfied in order to ensure that a new tenancy is an FBT are
complicated, involving the service of a pre-notice in much the same way as for short
residential tenancies.  The mechanics for avoiding the fallback rent review procedure are
equally complex, while the reliance on the Arbitration Act 1950 code, rather than the
existing 1986 Act code, may lead to unnecessary complications.  Complex new provisions
for end-of-tenancy compensation have also replaced the 1986 Act measures, which were
straightforward and uncontentious (and had been largely unchanged since the last
century).
The meticulous steps that the parties, effectively starting with a blank sheet of paper, have
to follow in order to ensure that every issue and all eventualities are covered, have thus
effectively precluded the very flexibility championed by the proponents of the system.
Model agreements and precedents have predictably been prepared by a number of
organisations, as well as most of the law firms handling rural work.  In common with the
previous forms of agricultural tenancy, the FBT has thus already assumed the guise of an
‘off-the-peg’ measure, rather than being the ‘made-to-measure’ agreement originally
envisaged.  In effect, therefore, all that has been achieved is the legislative legitimation of
landowner wishes to be able to assert their ‘rights’ according to their own needs.  The
price extracted for this presumed freedom is, however, high indeed, reflecting not only the
decline of the agricultural tenant, but also of the nature of landed property itself.
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The Management of Place and Space
As a result, agricultural tenancy legislation has ceased largely to reflect its positivist, black
letter antecedence, assuming instead a strong resemblance to sumptuary law.  Rather than
being a skilled, individualised, ‘partner’ to the relationship with the landowner, the role of
tenant has thus effectively been undermined, thus assuming the identity of ‘other’, in place
its former association with land owners.  At the core of this process is an evident shift
from ‘rights to property’ - the former ideas of property as social signification - to arms-
length, flexible interests in which there no responsibilities or duties, just financial
transactions.
Central to this shift is an increasing recognition of the essential dynamic of property - its
dual identity as both place (its socio-cultural attributes) and space (its physical attributes).
It is the nature of this duality which gives rise to what Fitzpatrick (1992) terms a ‘mute
ground’ in which those seeking to own, occupy or use land experience conflicting
constructs of deviance and conformity.  Rather than being unidimensional, however, the
subtle interrelationships between place, space and people ensure that the source - and
hence the avoidance - of deviance can never be isolated from the wider socio-cultural
context.  The construct of the ‘good’ participant in agricultural production is, therefore,
determined not by the land, nor the law, but by the contextualised power implicit in the
mute ground which connects them.
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Consequently, it is not so much space which necessarily determines practice, but rather the
interplay of practice, filling and giving meaning to space, and space, informing the
possibilities of practice.  Rather than space - the land - being the source of the power
which the dominant interests wish to protect, therefore, the power flows in the opposite
direction, based on an ability to convert social place into space.  It is the nature of this
‘conversion’, with its attendant possibilities and actualities of practice, which generates the
power (Chaney, 1994).
Space, or territoriality, thus becomes the metaphorical arena in which the effects of power
can be analysed and determined (Foucault, 1980), but according to the uses of that space
rather than the space itself.  Rather than being fixed, therefore, space is essentially a
transitional project, produced in a particular form for the duration of some interactional
business, then reproduced in a different form for a different purpose (Chaney, 1994).  The
construction of the demand, by both landowners and tenants, for ‘new’ agricultural
tenancies is the very manifestation of Foucault's power metaphor, with the level of
accessibility to these tenancies increasingly 'protected', as an allowance or dispensation, for
those 'unsuited' to a social or economic stake in the ownership of rural property.
Consequently, the ‘legal’ resolution of the ‘problem’ of the availability of farmland for rent
is much more closely associated with a 'civilising' mission than it is with any narrower form
of legal positivism.  By constructing the other, those demanding greater access to
tenancies, as deviant, the power of the territoriality implicit in the tenure structure has
effectively realigned the debate from questions about the power and signification of
ownership, to those about the nature and use of space (its construction as place).  The
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characteristic structures of social space have therefore been appropriated to symbolise
institutional form, and with it, the prescription of appropriate identities for the individual
participants.  Elements of the structure, such as the boundaries and rules of access to the
space, thus function to reproduce the desired social order (Chaney, 1994).
Central to this reproduction of the desired social order has been the representation of such
issues as technical rather than social.  This has enabled claims to be made about the extent
to which owners can accommodate tenants on 'their' land, but through individually
negotiated arrangements rather than the corporatist structures of the past.  This
demonstrates clearly a politically-legitimised appropriation of power relations, with
property ownership posited as a responsibility unsuited to the evident ephemerality of
'ordinary' people: they may temporarily occupy land for the purposes of farming, but only
under supervision and only to undertake 'approved' activities.
Conclusions
Recent evidence suggests that the ‘farm tenancy’ may enjoy a resurgence under the new
deregulated regime.  We would argue, however, that the concept of the ‘tenant farmer’
has been in decline since the turn of the century and that the Agricultural Tenancies Act
1995 has done nothing to arrest this.  Perhaps the greatest, and most intangible, threat to
farm tenancies is that they will continue to be devalued in the eyes of the rural community.
Already, with the shift to owner-occupation, tenant farmers who have not, for whatever
reason, sought personal enfranchisement, are becoming regarded as second-class citizens,
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the last vestiges of rural peasantry.  Farm Business Tenancies will thus continue to debase
the concept of tenancies and farm tenants.
The inevitable conclusion of this paper is that far from seeking to protect and enhance the
significance of the agricultural landlord/tenant relationship, the recent reforms have
effectively marginalised it.  Tenancies will become add-ons, granted only to existing
farmers who, as the few remaining secure tenancies fall-in, will increasingly be owner-
occupiers in their own right.  The much-heralded agricultural tenancy will thus become no
more than a vehicle for expansionism, fulfilling the same role that was played by share-
farming and other ‘alternative arrangements’ in the 1980s.
Rather than the management and administration of land representing a rational, defensible
and efficient method of resource allocation, therefore, it can be argued that this process
indicates a much more central concern with legitimising deviance.  This is based primarily
on the commodification of land, with the promotion of rights largely without
responsibilities, at the expense of both the resources and the people to which they
ostensibly relate.  At the core of this deviance is the continued promotion of the
dichotomous role of the consumer- or post-citizen - at the centre of sumptuary law.  While
carrying the responsibilities associated with civil and political rights, namely to maintain
the primacy and exclusivity of property rights, post-citizens’ (tenants’) enjoyment of social
rights are largely limited to those which they can purchase in an apparently free, but
actually highly regulated, market.
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Rather than being the neo-classical market assumed by formalist law, however, this new
market for agricultural tenancies is essential cultural, reflecting a populist rhetoric of
freedom in which the implicit social project of equity is nowhere to be found.  Unlike the
consumerism of wider, post-structuralist, popular culture, however, in this market, sellers
dominate.  By constructing the individual with respect to artefact - property - this market
is able to appropriate the territorial specificity of agricultural land in underwriting the
decline of positivist legal relations - and their increasing replacement by a form of
‘hyperlegality’ (Redhead, 1995) which seeks to provide a cultural replica of an original
which never existed - the Farm Business Tenancy as simulacrum.
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